Stable secretaries
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Publication:1999964
DOI10.1007/s00453-019-00569-6zbMath1423.68605arXiv1705.01589OpenAlexW3037829633MaRDI QIDQ1999964
Rann Smorodinsky, Boaz Patt-Shamir, Yuval Emek, Yakov Babichenko, Michal Feldman, Ron Peretz
Publication date: 27 June 2019
Published in: Algorithmica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1705.01589
Stopping times; optimal stopping problems; gambling theory (60G40) Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60) Matching models (91B68) Online algorithms; streaming algorithms (68W27)
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Cites Work
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