Using and abusing economic theory
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(26)- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. I. Key concepts and classical results
- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results
- The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont
- Bertrand oligopoly with boundedly rational consumers
- Separating equilibria in auctions with two types of bidders
- Promoting entry and efficiency via reserve prices
- The \(N\)-player war of attrition in the limit of infinitely many players
- Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources
- Information acquisition during a descending auction
- Design of discrete Dutch auctions with an uncertain number of bidders
- Banning bidders from all-pay auctions
- Combinatorial auctions for electronic business
- Quantum contracts between Schrödinger and a cat
- Dilemmas of an Economic Theorist
- Welfare and rationality guarantees for the simultaneous multiple-round ascending auction
- On cooperative games related to market situations and auctions
- Second chance offers in auctions
- Economics: between prediction and criticism
- An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders
- Ordering results on extremes of exponentiated location-scale models
- Principal-agent models
- Self-confirming price-prediction strategies for simultaneous one-shot auctions
- Introduction to the symposium
- Sequential auctions with imperfect quantity commitment
- Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions
- A measure of the variability of revenue in auctions: A look at the revenue equivalence theorem
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