Costly multidimensional screening
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Cites work
- A duality based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design
- A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
- A property of solutions to linear monopoly problems
- A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
- Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist
- Comparison methods for stochastic models and risks
- Delegation and nonmonetary incentives
- Dynamic contracting: an irrelevance theorem
- Dynamic mechanism design: a Myersonian approach
- Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
- Game theory
- Haggling over substitutes
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5485518 (Why is no real title available?)
- Infinite dimensional analysis. A hitchhiker's guide.
- Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources
- Money burning in the theory of delegation
- Monopoly and product quality
- Multi-dimensional screening: buyer-optimal learning and informational robustness
- Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design
- On a theorem of E. Helly
- Optimal Auction Design
- Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
- Robustly optimal mechanisms for selling multiple goods
- Robustness and separation in multidimensional screening
- Selling two identical objects
- Stochastic partial ordering
- Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist
- The Existence of Probability Measures with Given Marginals
- The optimality of upgrade pricing
- The theory of optimal delegation with an application to tariff caps
- What money can't buy: efficient mechanism design with costly signals
- When is pure bundling optimal?
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