On fairness via picking sequences in allocation of indivisible goods
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-87756-9_17OpenAlexW3211195417MaRDI QIDQ2695445FDOQ2695445
Authors: Laurent Gourvès, Julien Lesca, Anaëlle Wilczynski
Publication date: 31 March 2023
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-87756-9_17
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Problem solving in the context of artificial intelligence (heuristics, search strategies, etc.) (68T20) Decision theory (91B06) Social choice (91B14) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)
Cites Work
Cited In (6)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- On reachable assignments under dichotomous preferences
- Optimizing over serial dictatorships
- Computing welfare-maximizing fair allocations of indivisible goods
- Comparing algorithms for fair allocation of indivisible items with limited information
- Optimizing over serial dictatorships
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