Fair division of indivisible items between two people with identical preferences: Envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, and equity

DOI10.1007/S003550050019MaRDI QIDQ2388751zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Steven J. Brams, Peter Fishburn

Publication date 20 September 2005

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050019

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Fundamental topics (basic mathematics, methodology; applicable to economics in general) (91B02)

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Cited in

(25)

• A comparison of formulations and solution methods for the minimum-envy location problem
• A fair procedure in insurance
• Approximate maximin shares for groups of agents
• Fair division of indivisible items
• Two-person fair division of indivisible items when envy-freeness is impossible
• Almost envy-freeness in group resource allocation
• An equilibrium analysis of Knaster's fair division procedure
• No-envy and egalitarian-equivalence under multi-object-demand for heterogeneous objects
• The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items
• Fair allocation of indivisible goods: the two-agent case
• How to allocate hard candies fairly
• Approximate competitive equilibrium with generic budget
• On fairness via picking sequences in allocation of indivisible goods
• Fair division of indivisible items between two players: design parameters for contested pile methods
• The price of connectivity in fair division
• Fair in the Eyes of Others
• Fair division of indivisible items among people with similar preferences
• Comparing algorithms for fair allocation of indivisible items with limited information
• Group Envy Freeness and Group Pareto Efficiency in Fair Division with Indivisible Items
• Booster draft mechanisms for multi-object assignment
• Minimizing maximum dissatisfaction in the allocation of indivisible items under a common preference graph
• Fair assignment of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences
• Strategic divide and choose
• Brams-Taylor model of fair division for divisible and indivisible items
• A general branch-and-bound algorithm for fair division problems

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