Fair allocation of indivisible goods: the two-agent case
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Publication:2453428
DOI10.1007/S00355-012-0684-0zbMATH Open1288.91129OpenAlexW2010200435MaRDI QIDQ2453428FDOQ2453428
Authors: Eve Ramaekers 
Publication date: 6 June 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0684-0
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Cites Work
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- Equity and the Informational Basis of Collective Choice
- Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems
- Fair division of indivisible items
- A simple procedure for finding equitable allocations of indivisible goods
- Efficiency and envy-freeness in fair division of indivisible goods: logical representation and complexity
- Welfare bounds in the fair division problem
- Fair division under joint ownership: Recent results and open problems
- An Application of the Shapley Value to Fair Division with Money
- Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems
- Fair division of indivisible items between two people with identical preferences: Envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, and equity
- The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items
- Fair division of indivisible items among people with similar preferences
- Population monotonicity in economies with one indivisible good
- Equitable distribution of indivisible objects
- Intermediate preferences and Rawlsian arbitration rules
Cited In (24)
- Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice
- Fair division is hard even for amicable agents
- A simple procedure for finding equitable allocations of indivisible goods
- Money-egalitarian-equivalent and gain-maximin allocations of indivisible items with monetary compensation
- Fair allocation of disputed properties
- Nondiscrimination and monotonicity in fair division
- Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade
- A new fairness notion in the assignment of indivisible resources
- Fairness and externalities
- No Agent Left Behind: Dynamic Fair Division of Multiple Resources
- Fairness and implementability in allocation of indivisible objects with monetary compensations
- When dividing mixed manna is easier than dividing goods: competitive equilibria with a constant number of chores
- Packaging for allocation
- Democratic fair allocation of indivisible goods
- Distributed fair allocation of indivisible goods
- Two-player fair division of indivisible items: comparison of algorithms
- Scoring rules for the allocation of indivisible goods
- Fairly allocating many goods with few queries
- The price of fairness for a small number of indivisible items
- FAIR ALLOCATION BASED ON TWO CRITERIA : A DEA GAME VIEW OF "ADD THEM UP AND DIVIDE BY TWO"(<Special Issue>Operations Research for Performance Evaluation)
- Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint
- Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods to Asymmetric Agents
- The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods
- Efficiency and envy-freeness in fair division of indivisible goods: logical representation and complexity
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