Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2513284
DOI10.1007/s00355-014-0797-8zbMath1306.91093OpenAlexW3123807768MaRDI QIDQ2513284
Flip Klijn, Paula Jaramillo, Çağatay Kayı
Publication date: 2 February 2015
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10842
Related Items (3)
Reassignment-proof rules for land rental problems ⋮ A sequential bargaining protocol for land rental arrangements ⋮ Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Weakly fair allocations and strategy-proofness
- Non-manipulable assignment of individuals to positions revisited
- Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness
- Games of fair division
- A general strategy proof fair allocation mechanism
- Constrainedly fair job assignments under minimum wages
- A Solomonic solution to the problem of assigning a private indivisible good
- Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the Groves mechanisms
- Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods
- Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness
- Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice
- Incentives in Teams
- Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
- Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
This page was built for publication: Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint