Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint

DOI10.1007/s00355-014-0797-8zbMath1306.91093OpenAlexW3123807768MaRDI QIDQ2513284

Flip Klijn, Paula Jaramillo, Çağatay Kayı

Publication date: 2 February 2015

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10842

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (3)

Reassignment-proof rules for land rental problems ⋮ A sequential bargaining protocol for land rental arrangements ⋮ Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities

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