Manipulating picking sequences

zbMATH Open1366.68338MaRDI QIDQ5282966FDOQ5282966

Authors: Sylvain Bouveret, Jérôme Lang 

Publication date: 18 July 2017

Full work available at URL: http://ebooks.iospress.nl/volumearticle/36930

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42)

Cited In (10)

• Efficient reallocation under additive and responsive preferences
• Strategy-proofness of scoring allocation correspondences for indivisible goods
• Manipulating waiting-plus-detour-time mechanisms for pickup and delivery problems
• Equilibria in sequential allocation
• Picking sequences and monotonicity in weighted fair division
• Parameterized complexity of manipulating sequential allocation
• Fair division of indivisible goods: recent progress and open questions
• On fairness via picking sequences in allocation of indivisible goods
• Allocating indivisible goods to strategic agents: pure Nash equilibria and fairness
• Approximate and strategyproof maximin share allocation of chores with ordinal preferences

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