Nash rationalization of collective choice over lotteries

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.07.002zbMath1155.91302OpenAlexW2079503887MaRDI QIDQ1005758

Thomas Demuynck, Luc Lauwers

Publication date: 10 March 2009

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://dipot.ulb.ac.be/dspace/bitstream/2013/252245/3/002.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

rationalizabilityindependence conditionbinary extensionsNash equilibrium with mixed strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items

Note on unique Nash equilibrium in continuous games, Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games, An algebraic approach to revealed preference, Backwards-induction rationalizability of choice functions over an arbitrary set, The computational complexity of rationalizing boundedly rational choice behavior, The testable implications of zero-sum games

Cites Work

• Mixed strategy play and the minimax hypothesis
• Game theory via revealed preferences
• Revealed preference theory on the choice of lotteries
• Indecisive choice theory
• Stochastic choice and consistency in decision making under risk: An experimental study
• On the testable implications of collective choice theories
• Revealed preference and linear utility
• Revealed Preference Theory
• Choice Functions and Revealed Preference
• Revealed preference and expected utility