Nash rationalization of collective choice over lotteries

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2008.07.002MaRDI QIDQ1005758zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Thomas Demuynck, Luc Lauwers

Publication date 10 March 2009

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://dipot.ulb.ac.be/dspace/bitstream/2013/252245/3/002.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

binary extensionsindependence conditionNash equilibrium with mixed strategiesrationalizability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

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Cites work

• Choice Functions and Revealed Preference
• Game theory via revealed preferences
• Indecisive choice theory
• Mixed strategy play and the minimax hypothesis
• On the testable implications of collective choice theories
• Revealed preference and expected utility
• Revealed preference and linear utility
• Revealed Preference Theory
• Revealed preference theory on the choice of lotteries
• Stochastic choice and consistency in decision making under risk: An experimental study

Cited in

(9)

• On the testable implications of collective choice theories
• Tacit coordination in Choice between certain outcomes in endogenously determined lotteries
• Note on unique Nash equilibrium in continuous games
• The computational complexity of rationalizing boundedly rational choice behavior
• The testable implications of zero-sum games
• Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games
• An algebraic approach to revealed preference
• Backwards-induction rationalizability of choice functions over an arbitrary set
• Recent advances on testability in economic equilibrium models

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