Identification of payoffs in repeated games

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.07.004zbMATH Open1394.91034OpenAlexW2493453559MaRDI QIDQ324145FDOQ324145

Authors: Colin Stewart, Byung-Soo Lee 

Publication date: 10 October 2016

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.07.004

Recommendations

• On the equilibrium payoffs set of two player repeated games with imperfect monitoring
• Bounding payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring: \(n\)-player games
• Repeated games where the payoffs and monitoring structure are unknown
• When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?
• Nash equilibria of repeated games with observable payoff vectors

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesbest-response equivalencepayoff identification

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• An Experimental Study of Belief Learning Using Elicited Beliefs
• Best response equivalence
• Identifying higher-order rationality
• The scope of the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium
• On the testable implications of collective choice theories
• Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games
• Beliefs and endogenous cognitive levels: an experimental study
• General revealed preference theory
• Every choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable
• Game theory via revealed preferences

Cited In (2)

• Identification in games: changing places
• Empirical framework for two-player repeated games with random states

This page was built for publication: Identification of payoffs in repeated games

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q324145)