Restricted complementarity and paths to stability in matching with couples
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Publication:6125927
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.09.005OpenAlexW4387190430MaRDI QIDQ6125927
Publication date: 9 April 2024
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.09.005
Cites Work
- Corrigendum to ``stable matchings and preferences of couples
- Paths to stability for matching markets with couples
- A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure
- Matching with contracts, substitutes and two-unit demand
- Stable matchings and preferences of couples
- Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
- Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
- MATCHING WITH COUPLES: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY SURVEY
- Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
- The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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