Sensitivity of fair prices in assignment markets

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2023.09.003MaRDI QIDQ6204151FDO

Authors Tamás Solymosi

Publication date 9 April 2024

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

assignment gamefair pricetwo-sided matching marketcompetitive pricesensitivity range

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Adjusting prices in the multiple-partners assignment game
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Competitive pricing and the core: with reference to matching
• Generalized three-sided assignment markets: core consistency and competitive prices
• One-seller assignment markets with multi-unit demands: core and competitive equilibrium

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3771380 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Theorem on Boolean Matrices
• A graph theoretic approach to markets for indivisible goods
• A survey on assignment markets
• An algorithm for finding the nucleolus of assignment games
• Assignment Problems and the Location of Economic Activities
• Characterization of the Walrasian equilibria of the assignment model
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
• The assignment game. I: The core
• The assignment game: the \(\tau\)-value
• The outcome of competitive equilibrium rules in buyer-seller markets when the agents play strategically
• Valuation monotonicity, fairness and stability in assignment problems

Cited in

(1)

• Optimization methods and algorithms

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