On the expected payment of mechanisms for task allocation
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Network protocols (68M12) Distributed systems (68M14) Graph theory (including graph drawing) in computer science (68R10) Programming involving graphs or networks (90C35) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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