Frugality in path auctions

MaRDI QIDQ5501329zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Edith Elkind, Amit Sahai, Ken Steiglitz

Publication date 3 August 2015

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Programming involving graphs or networks (90C35) Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(30)

• The path player game
• Maximizing the minimum load for selfish agents
• Path auctions with multiple edge ownership
• Convergence of VCG mechanism to ex-post budget balance in a model of land acquisition
• Auctions for social lending: a theoretical analysis
• Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification
• Mechanism design for policy routing
• Fault tolerant mechanism design
• The price of imperfect competition for a spanning network
• On certain connectivity properties of the internet topology
• How much can taxes help selfish routing?
• Approximation guarantee of OSP mechanisms: the case of machine scheduling and facility location
• Diffusion auction design
• Frugal path mechanisms
• First-passage percolation on a ladder graph, and the path cost in a VCG auction
• Efficient money burning in general domains
• Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1962848 (Why is no real title available?)
• False-name-proof mechanisms for path auctions in social networks
• Bounding the payment of approximate truthful mechanisms
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2119764 (Why is no real title available?)
• Commodity auctions and frugality ratios
• Efficient money burning in general domains
• Combinatorial auctions without money
• Using Nash Implementation to Achieve Better Frugality Ratios
• Preemptive Scheduling on Selfish Machines
• Maximizing the Minimum Load for Selfish Agents
• Frugal Routing on Wireless Ad-Hoc Networks
• Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions
• A monotone approximation algorithm for scheduling with precedence constraints

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