Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-87744-8_59MaRDI QIDQ5900469zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Paolo Penna, Carmine Ventre

Publication date 25 November 2008

Published in Algorithms - ESA 2008 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-87744-8_59

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Network design and communication in computer systems (68M10) Network protocols (68M12) Distributed systems (68M14) Distributed algorithms (68W15) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• A BGP-based mechanism for lowest-cost routing
• A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms
• A Lower Bound of 1 + φ for Truthful Scheduling Mechanisms
• Algorithmic mechanism design
• Algorithms, games, and the internet
• Automata, Languages and Programming
• Collusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents
• Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions
• Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
• Frugality in path auctions
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3670138 (Why is no real title available?)
• Improved Lower Bounds for Non-utilitarian Truthfulness
• Incentives in Teams
• Manipulation through bribes
• New Constructions of Mechanisms with Verification
• Setting lower bounds on truthfulness (extended abstract)
• The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices

Cited in

(15)

• Fast payment schemes for truthful mechanisms with verification
• On the feasibility of maximal collusion
• A collusion problem and its solution
• Scheduling without payments
• Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification
• Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains
• Collusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents
• Computer-aided verification for mechanism design
• Approaching utopia, strong truthfulness and externality-resistant mechanisms
• Verifiably truthful mechanisms
• Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification
• Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness
• Collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification yielding optimal solutions
• Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions
• SOFSEM 2004: Theory and Practice of Computer Science

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