Learning by matching

DOI10.3982/TE3088zbMATH Open1445.91035OpenAlexW2972854588MaRDI QIDQ3299503FDOQ3299503

Authors: Yi-Chun Chen, Gaoji Hu 

Publication date: 23 July 2020

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te3088

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zbMATH Keywords

convergencestabilityincomplete informationtwo-sided matchinglearning-blocking path

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68) Labor markets (91B39)

Cited In (9)

• Job matching within and across firms
• Bayesian stable states
• Not all is lost: sorting and self-stabilizing sets
• Stability in sequential matching with incomplete information
• Tailored recommendations on a matching platform
• Matching and anonymity
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Learning by mirror averaging
• Paths to stability in two-sided matching under uncertainty

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