School choice with costly information acquisition

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2023.11.009MaRDI QIDQ6188680zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tyler Maxey

Publication date 11 January 2024

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.009

zbMATH Keywords

two-sided matchingwinner's cursematching with incomplete informationmatching with search

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Information acquisition and provision in school choice: a theoretical investigation
• Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab
• School choice with asymmetric information: priority design and the curse of acceptance
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Cites work

• Assignment mechanisms: common preferences and information acquisition
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Information acquisition and provision in school choice: an experimental study
• Optimal Search for the Best Alternative
• School choice with asymmetric information: priority design and the curse of acceptance
• Sequential Tests of Statistical Hypotheses
• Stability with one-sided incomplete information
• Stable matching with incomplete information
• Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility
• Two-sided matching with indifferences
• Whether or not to open Pandora's box

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