School choice with costly information acquisition

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.009zbMath1530.91441OpenAlexW4389209327MaRDI QIDQ6188680

Tyler Maxey

Publication date: 11 January 2024

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.009

zbMATH Keywords

two-sided matchingwinner's cursematching with incomplete informationmatching with search

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Stability with one-sided incomplete information
• Whether or not to open Pandora's box
• Assignment mechanisms: common preferences and information acquisition
• Information acquisition and provision in school choice: an experimental study
• Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility
• Two-sided matching with indifferences
• Optimal Search for the Best Alternative
• Stable Matching With Incomplete Information
• School choice with asymmetric information: Priority design and the curse of acceptance
• Sequential Tests of Statistical Hypotheses
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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