Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences
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Cites work
- A bargaining set for roommate problems
- A generalization of Scarf's theorem: An \(\alpha\)-core existence theorem without transitivity or completeness
- A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
- A new bargaining set of an \(N\)-person game and endogenous coalition formation
- A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues
- Coalition formation problems with externalities
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- Implementation of the core in college admissions problems when colleagues matter
- Incentives and implementation in marriage markets with externalities
- Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
- Marriage, honesty, and stability
- Matching with aggregate externalities
- Matching with Externalities
- Matching with externalities: the role of prudence and social connectedness in stability
- Matching with preferences over colleagues solves classical matching
- Multilateral matching
- On cores and indivisibility
- On likely solutions of a stable marriage problem
- On random stable partitions
- Peer Effects and Stability in Matching Markets
- Random stable matchings
- School choice with neighbors
- Some inequalities relating to the partial sum of binomial probabilities
- Stability and preference alignment in matching and coalition formation
- Stability in large matching markets with complementarities
- Stability in matching markets with peer effects
- Stability of marriage with externalities
- Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
- Stable husbands
- Stable matchings and preferences of couples
- Stable one-to-one matchings with externalities
- Stable roommates problem with random preferences
- Strategic issues in one-to-one matching with externalities
- The ``stable roommates problem with random preferences
- The assignment game with negative externalities and bounded rationality
- The Average Number of Stable Matchings
- The core for housing markets with limited externalities
- The Core of a Cooperative Game Without Side Payments
- The roommate problem with externalities
- Two-sided matching problems with externalities
- Two-sided matching with externalities: a survey
- Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model
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