Stable husbands

DOI10.1002/RSA.3240010102MaRDI QIDQ5750860zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Donald E. Knuth, Boris Pittel, Rajeev Motwani

Publication date 1990

Published in Random Structures \& Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1002/rsa.3240010102

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Permutations, words, matrices (05A05) Edge subsets with special properties (factorization, matching, partitioning, covering and packing, etc.) (05C70) Combinatorial optimization (90C27)

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Cited in

(34)

• On a random graph evolving by degrees
• On the probabilities of the mutual agreement match
• On likely solutions of a stable marriage problem
• On random exchange-stable matchings
• On random stable partitions
• Bipartite choices
• On the equivalence of two competing affirmative actions in school choice
• On random stable matchings: cyclic ones with strict preferences and two-sided ones with partially ordered preferences
• One-sided version of Gale-Shapley proposal algorithm and its likely behavior under random preferences
• On sparsity of the solution to a random quadratic optimization problem
• A stable marriage requires communication
• A number of stable matchings in models of the Gale-Shapley type
• Descending the stable matching lattice: how many strategic agents are required to turn pessimality to optimality?
• The graphs of stably matchable pairs
• The concentration of the maximum degree in the duplication-divergence models
• Asymptotic distribution of the numbers of vertices and arcs of the giant strong component in sparse random digraphs
• The Average Number of Stable Matchings
• On the likely number of solutions for the stable marriage problem
• Expected coalescence time for a nonuniform allocation process
• On a Random Instance of a ‘Stable Roommates’ Problem: Likely Behavior of the Proposal Algorithm
• On Subgraph Sizes in Random Graphs
• Tight Markov chains and random compositions
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1496581 (Why is no real title available?)
• Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints
• Interview with Don Knuth
• On Likely Solutions of the Stable Matching Problem with Unequal Numbers of Men and Women
• A Stable Marriage Requires Communication
• Almost all graphs with average degree 4 are 3-colorable
• Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences
• A direct proof of the short-side advantage in random matching markets
• Tiered random matching markets: rank is proportional to popularity
• Welfare effects of integrating unbalanced matching markets
• Marriage matching and gender satisfaction
• Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor

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