Unbalanced random matching markets with partial preferences

DOI10.4230/LIPICS.ICALP.2025.125MaRDI QIDQ7397582zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Aditya Potukuchi, Shikha Singh

Publication date 2025

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPICS.ICALP.2025.125

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Theory of software (68Nxx) Theory of computing (68Qxx)

Cites work

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• Tiered random matching markets: rank is proportional to popularity
• Two-sided matching markets with strongly correlated preferences

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