An analysis of the stable marriage assignment algorithm

DOI10.1007/BF01932966MaRDI QIDQ5661507zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Leslie B. Wilson

Publication date 1972

Published in BIT (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01932966

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Permutations, words, matrices (05A05) Exact enumeration problems, generating functions (05A15) Algorithms in computer science (68W99)

Cites work

• A Graph-Theoretic Approach to a Class of Integer-Programming Problems
• An algorithm for the assignment problem
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3249395 (Why is no real title available?)
• Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets

Cited in

(24)

• A probabilistic version of the stable marriage problem
• The average performance of a parallel stable mariage algorithm
• On random exchange-stable matchings
• Social integration in two-sided matching markets
• On random stable matchings: cyclic ones with strict preferences and two-sided ones with partially ordered preferences
• One-sided version of Gale-Shapley proposal algorithm and its likely behavior under random preferences
• The stable marriage problem: an interdisciplinary review from the physicist's perspective
• A stable marriage requires communication
• The losses from integration in matching markets can be large
• Descending the stable matching lattice: how many strategic agents are required to turn pessimality to optimality?
• On the likely number of solutions for the stable marriage problem
• On a Random Instance of a ‘Stable Roommates’ Problem: Likely Behavior of the Proposal Algorithm
• On Likely Solutions of the Stable Matching Problem with Unequal Numbers of Men and Women
• Approximation algorithms in combinatorial scientific computing
• Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems
• School choice with independent versus consolidated districts
• On constrained matchings, stable under random preferences
• A direct proof of the short-side advantage in random matching markets
• Tiered random matching markets: rank is proportional to popularity
• The distribution of envy in matching markets
• Welfare effects of integrating unbalanced matching markets
• Marriage matching and gender satisfaction
• A parallel algorithm to solve the stable marriage problem
• The necessary and sufficient condition for the worst-case male optimal stable matching

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