One-sided version of Gale-Shapley proposal algorithm and its likely behavior under random preferences
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Publication:2223683
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Cites work
- A generalization of the stable matching problem
- A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a complete stable matching
- Algorithmics of matching under preferences. With a foreword by Kurt Mehlhorn
- An analysis of the stable marriage assignment algorithm
- An efficient algorithm for the “stable roommates” problem
- An upper bound for the solvability probability of a random stable roommates instance
- Balls and bins: A study in negative dependence
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3736679 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 45086 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3558960 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 958014 (Why is no real title available?)
- On a Random Instance of a ‘Stable Roommates’ Problem: Likely Behavior of the Proposal Algorithm
- On likely solutions of a stable marriage problem
- On Likely Solutions of the Stable Matching Problem with Unequal Numbers of Men and Women
- On random stable partitions
- On the likely number of solutions for the stable marriage problem
- Random stable matchings
- Stable husbands
- Stable matchings and stable partitions∗
- The ``stable roommates problem with random preferences
- The Average Number of Stable Matchings
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