Recommendations
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- A further note on the stable matching problem
- An analysis of the stable marriage assignment algorithm
- Beauty and distance in the stable marriage problem
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
- Kidney Exchange
- The Average Number of Stable Matchings
Cited in
(12)- Sisterhood in the Gale-Shapley matching algorithm
- The losses from integration in matching markets can be large
- Stable husbands
- Distribution of the total happiness level under a random matching
- MALE AND FEMALE MARRIAGE RETURNS TO SCHOOLING
- The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice
- On the probabilities of the mutual agreement match
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3889577 (Why is no real title available?)
- Matching in marriage and markets
- School choice with independent versus consolidated districts
- Gender consistent resolving rules in marriage problems
- The matchmaking paradox: a statistical explanation
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