Marriage matching and gender satisfaction

DOI10.1007/S00355-008-0303-2MaRDI QIDQ733764zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Vicki Knoblauch

Publication date 19 October 2009

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0303-2

zbMATH Keywords

matchingGale-Shapleywomen's rankings

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms (68W40) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• On likely solutions of a stable marriage problem
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5572758
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• A further note on the stable matching problem
• An analysis of the stable marriage assignment algorithm
• Beauty and distance in the stable marriage problem
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
• Kidney Exchange
• The Average Number of Stable Matchings

Cited in

(12)

• Sisterhood in the Gale-Shapley matching algorithm
• The losses from integration in matching markets can be large
• Stable husbands
• Distribution of the total happiness level under a random matching
• MALE AND FEMALE MARRIAGE RETURNS TO SCHOOLING
• The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice
• On the probabilities of the mutual agreement match
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3889577 (Why is no real title available?)
• Matching in marriage and markets
• School choice with independent versus consolidated districts
• Gender consistent resolving rules in marriage problems
• The matchmaking paradox: a statistical explanation

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