Matching markets with farsighted couples
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Cites work
- An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
- Coalition formation among farsighted agents
- Coalition formation under dominance invariance
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Corrigendum to ``stable matchings and preferences of couples
- Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
- Dominance invariant one-to-one matching problems
- Farsighted coalitional stability
- Farsighted stability in hedonic games
- Farsightedly stable networks
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- Keeping partners together: Algorithmic results for the hospitals/residents problem with couples
- Local farsightedness in network formation
- Matching with contracts, substitutes and two-unit demand
- Matching with couples: a multidisciplinary survey
- Matching with myopic and farsighted players
- NP-complete stable matching problems
- Paths to stability for matching markets with couples
- Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
- Restricted complementarity and paths to stability in matching with couples
- Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask)
- Stability in large matching markets with complementarities
- Stable assignment with couples: parameterized complexity and local search
- Stable matching with couples: an empirical study
- Stable matchings and preferences of couples
- Stable sets in matching problems with coalitional sovereignty and path dominance
- The farsighted stable set
- von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems
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