Credible sets
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Cites work
- An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
- Coalition formation among farsighted agents
- Coalition formation and history dependence
- Coalition formation under dominance invariance
- Coalitional stability under perfect foresight
- Equilibrium coalitional behavior
- Farsighted coalitional stability
- Farsighted objections and maximality in one-to-one matching problems
- Farsighted stability in patent licensing: an abstract game approach
- Farsighted stability with heterogeneous expectations
- Farsightedly stable networks
- Farsightedness and cautiousness in coalition formation games with positive spillovers
- Full farsighted rationality
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
- Implementation in largest consistent set via rights structures
- Local farsightedness in network formation
- Matching markets with farsighted couples
- Matching with myopic and farsighted players
- Maximality in the farsighted stable set
- Maximin, minimax, and von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stable sets
- Myopic and farsighted stable sets in 2-player strategic-form games
- Rational expectations and farsighted stability
- Rationalizability for social environments
- Single-payoff farsighted stable sets in strategic games with dominant punishment strategies
- Social rationalizability with mediation
- Stability of alliance networks
- The farsighted stable set
- von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching
Cited in
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