Stability of alliance networks

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2023.04.008MaRDI QIDQ6160137zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Xinyue Cai, Mert Kimya

Publication date 23 June 2023

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.04.008

zbMATH Keywords

alliancescoalitional gamesfarsighted stabilityfarsighted stable setnetworkspower

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cites work

• An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
• Coalition formation and history dependence
• Coalition formation as a dynamic process.
• Coalition Formation in Non-Democracies
• Coalitional stability under perfect foresight
• Equilibrium coalitional behavior
• Farsighted coalitional stability
• Farsighted network formation
• Farsightedly stable networks
• Friends and enemies: a model of signed network formation
• Full farsighted rationality
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
• Maximality in the farsighted stable set
• Networks and farsighted stability
• Networks in conflict: theory and evidence from the great war of africa
• Pillage and property
• Power and efficiency in production pillage games
• Rational expectations and farsighted stability
• Rationalizability for social environments
• Risk-sharing networks and farsighted stability
• Stability of networks under horizon-\(K\) farsightedness
• The myopic stable set for social environments
• The strategy of conquest

Cited in

(11)

• The alliance formation puzzle and capacity constraints
• Alliances and Related Domination Parameters
• Stability in referral systems
• Brothers in arms -- an experiment on the alliance puzzle
• Networks in conflict: theory and evidence from the great war of africa
• Stable and efficient coalitional networks
• Coalition formation under dominance invariance
• How alliances form and conflict ensues
• Credible sets
• Differential games of Cournot oligopoly with consideration of pollution, network structure, and continuous updating
• Axiomatization of the farsighted stable set and the (strong) rational expectations farsighted stable set

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