Deferred acceptance algorithm with retrade

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2022.08.004zbMATH Open1505.91136OpenAlexW4298007256MaRDI QIDQ2108764FDOQ2108764

Authors: Akihiko Matsui, Megumi Murakami 

Publication date: 20 December 2022

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.08.004

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zbMATH Keywords

cyclical prioritydeferred acceptance algorithm (DA) with retrademinimum demandperfect market equilibrium (PME)reversed priority

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

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• Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
• A note on the strong core of a market with indivisible goods
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• Markovian assignment rules
• The existence and computation of competitive equilibria in markets with an indivisible commodity
• Stability in dynamic matching markets
• Integral boundary points of convex polyhedra
• MULTIPERIOD MATCHING
• Dynamics, stability, and foresight in the Shapley-Scarf housing market

Cited In (2)

• Retrading in market games.
• Maximal domains for strategy-proof pairwise exchange

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