On the convergence of swap dynamics to Pareto-optimal matchings

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-35389-6_8MaRDI QIDQ776241zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Felix Brandt, Anaëlle Wilczynski

Publication date 30 June 2020

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35389-6_8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Algorithms and Computation
• Algorithms and Computation
• On computing Pareto stable assignments
• Pareto stable matchings under one-sided matroid constraints
• Pareto optimality in many-to-many matching problems

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3558960 (Why is no real title available?)
• Algorithmics of matching under preferences. With a foreword by Kurt Mehlhorn
• Algorithms for Pareto optimal exchange with bounded exchange cycles
• An efficient algorithm for the “stable roommates” problem
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Constrained swap dynamics over a social network in distributed resource reallocation
• Dynamics in matching and coalition formation games with structural constraints
• Geometric stable roommates
• House allocation with existing tenants
• Local matching dynamics in social networks
• Matching under preferences
• On cores and indivisibility
• On the complexity of exchange-stable roommates
• Pareto optimality in coalition formation
• Paths to marriage stability
• Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
• Random paths to stability in the roommate problem
• The exchange-stable marriage problem
• The roommates problem revisited
• Uncoordinated two-sided matching markets

Cited in

(2)

• Stability based on single-agent deviations in additively separable hedonic games
• On reachable assignments in cycles

This page was built for publication: On the convergence of swap dynamics to Pareto-optimal matchings

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q776241)