Stable Matchings with Ties, Master Preference Lists, and Matroid Constraints
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Publication:3449577
DOI10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_1zbMath1358.91078MaRDI QIDQ3449577
Publication date: 4 November 2015
Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2324/1500418
91B68: Matching models
Related Items
A Matroid Generalization of the Super-Stable Matching Problem, Pareto Stable Matchings under One-Sided Matroid Constraints, Three-dimensional stable matching with hybrid preferences, Popular matchings with two-sided preference lists and matroid constraints
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