Coalitional manipulability in school choice
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Cites work
- A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem'
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Characterizing priorities for deferred acceptance with or without outside options
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability
- Comparing school choice and college admissions mechanisms by their strategic accessibility
- Constrained school choice
- Course bidding at business schools
- Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- Manipulability in school choice
- Modifications of Boston, Taiwanese and Chinese mechanisms are not comparable via counting manipulating students
- Robustness to manipulations in school choice
- School Choice with Consent*
- Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings
- Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- Strategy‐proof and group strategy‐proof stable mechanisms: An equivalence
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- The manipulability of the deferred acceptance mechanism without outside options
- The modified Boston mechanism
- Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
- When do reforms meet fairness concerns in school admissions?
- When preference misreporting is harm[less]ful?
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