On the positive association of parliamentary social choice functions

DOI10.1007/S00355-009-0432-2MaRDI QIDQ976973zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Boniface Mbih, Issofa Moyouwou, Xingyu Zhao

Publication date 16 June 2010

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0432-2

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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• Equilibrium under @a-Majority Voting
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• Social choice and individual values
• Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules

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