Positionalist voting rules: a general definition and axiomatic characterizations
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148878 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3854738 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3400720 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
- A Theorem on Utilitarianism
- A characterization result for the plurality rule
- A proof technique for social choice with variable electorate
- A simple characterization of plurality rule
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
- Axioms for Lexicographic Preferences
- Characterizations of scoring methods for preference aggregation
- Equity and the Informational Basis of Collective Choice
- Equity in Two Person Situations: Some Consequences
- Equity, Arrow's Conditions, and Rawls' Difference Principle
- Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1.
- Intuitive Probability on Finite Sets
- Is majority consistency possible?
- On Weights and Measures: Informational Constraints in Social Welfare Analysis
- Positionalist voting functions
- Possibility Theorems with Interpersonally Comparable Welfare Levels
- Ranking methods based on valued preference relations. A characterization of the net flow method
- Social Choice Scoring Functions
- Social Choice and Individual Ranking I
- Social Choice and Individual Rankings II
- Social choice and individual values
- Summation Social Choice Functions
- The Copeland choice function. An axiomatic characterization
- The greatest unhappiness of the least number
Cited in
(11)- Robust winner determination in positional scoring rules with uncertain weights
- Bivariate scoring rules: unifying the characterizations of positional scoring rules and Kemeny's rule
- On the positive association of parliamentary social choice functions
- Positional voting methods satisfying the weak mutual majority and Condorcet loser principles
- The reinforcement axiom under sequential positional rules
- Duplication in OWA-generated positional aggregation rules
- Scoring indices, top-truncated preferences, and splitting invariance
- A non-lexicographic rule in the preference-approval setting
- Opinion aggregation: Borda and Condorcet revisited
- On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules
- Condorcet consistent scoring rules and single-peakedness
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