Is majority consistency possible?

DOI10.1007/S00355-015-0913-4MaRDI QIDQ258932zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Eyal Baharad, Shmuel Nitzan

Publication date 10 March 2016

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0913-4

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Majority-approval social choice
• Condorcet vs. Borda in light of a dual majoritarian approach
• On the justice of decision rules
• The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule
• A general concept of majority rule

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2038875 (Why is no real title available?)
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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3400720 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• A characterization result for the plurality rule
• A simple characterization of majority rule
• A simple characterization of plurality rule
• Advances in prospect theory: cumulative representation of uncertainty
• An efficiency characterization of plurality social choice on simple preference domains
• Approval voting reconsidered
• Characterizations of scoring methods for preference aggregation
• Characterizing best-worst voting systems in the scoring context
• Positionalist voting functions
• Some general results on the metric rationalization for social decision rules
• The Borda Rule and Pareto Stability: A Comment
• The Borda dictionary
• The Borda rule, Condorcet consistency and Condorcet stability
• The costs of implementing the majority principle: The golden voting rule
• The inverse plurality rule-an axiomatization
• Why the Count de Borda cannot beat the Marquis de Condorcet

Cited in

(10)

• Scoring rules cannot respect majority in choice and elimination simultaneously
• On the justice of decision rules
• The socially acceptable scoring rule
• A note on scoring rules that respect majority in choice and elimination.
• Self-consistency of decision rules for group decision making
• Positionalist voting rules: a general definition and axiomatic characterizations
• Scoring rules and consensus
• Absolute qualified majoritarianism: how does the threshold matter?
• What majority decisions are possible
• Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on difference of votes

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