What majority decisions are possible

DOI10.1016/J.DISC.2008.05.010MaRDI QIDQ1025491zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors S. Shelah

Publication date 19 June 2009

Published in Discrete Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/math/0405119

zbMATH Keywords

choice functionCondorcet's paradoxmajority decisiontournament

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Abstract: Suppose we are given a family of choice functions on pairs from a given finite set (with at least three elements) closed under permutations of the given set. The set is considered the set of alternatives (say candidates for an office). The question is, what are the choice functions c on pairs of this set of the following form: for some (finite) family of ``voters, each having a preference, i.e., a choice from each pair from the given family, c{x,y} is chosen by the preference of the majority of voters. We give full characterization.

Review text

\textit{D. C. McGarvey} [Econometrica 21, 608--610 (1953)] showed that every asymmetric relation on a finite set of candidates \(M\) reflects the pairwise preferences of some finite profile of voters, where each voter's contribution to the profile is a strictly linear preference order on \(M\). McGarvey's theorem has since been refined by \textit{R. Stearns} [Am. Math. Mon. 66, 761--763 (1959; Zbl 0090.25101)], \textit{P. Erdős} and \textit{L. Moser} [Publ. Math. Inst. Hung. Acad. Sci., Ser. A 9, 125--132 (1964; Zbl 0136.44901)], and \textit{N. Alon} [Adv. Appl. Math. 29, No. 1, 126--135 (2002; Zbl 1020.91012)]. Consider McGarvey's theorem to be the assertion ``arbitrary asymmetric relations on \(M\) are generated from strict linear orders through the process of compiling pairwise preferences. In the paper under review the author considers the following question: aside from the strict linear orders, what other kinds of choice functions generate arbitrary asymmetric relations? He proves the striking result that the strict linear orders may be replaced by any non-empty family \(\mathfrak{D}\) of functions \(c(x,y)\) such that \(c(x,y)=c(y,x)\in \{x,y\}\) for all \(c\in \mathfrak{D}\) and \(x\neq y\in M\); \(\mathfrak{D}\) is closed under permutations of \(M\); and there exist \(c\in \mathfrak{D}\) and \(x\in M\) such that \(\left| \{y\neq x\in M:c(x,y)=y\}\right| \neq \left| \{y\neq x\in M:c(x,y)=x\}\right| \).

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3221981 (Why is no real title available?)
• The Voting Problem
• Voting paradoxes and digraphs realizations
• What majority decisions are possible

Cited in

(12)

• What majority decisions are possible
• Majority functional operators in voting theory
• On -majority voting paradoxes
• Majority cycles in a multi-dimensional setting
• Intrinsic Limitations of the Majority Rule, an Algorithmic Approach
• On the structure of voting systems between two alternatives
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4091537 (Why is no real title available?)
• Construction of aggregation paradoxes through load-sharing models
• Reduction theorems in the social choice theory
• Incoherent majorities: the McGarvey problem in judgement aggregation
• An extension of McGarvey's theorem from the perspective of the plurality collective choice mechanism
• Majority decisions when abstention is possible

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