Majority judgment vs. approval voting

DOI10.1287/OPRE.2019.1877MaRDI QIDQ5095141zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Rida Laraki, Michel Balinski

Publication date 5 August 2022

Published in Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2019.1877

zbMATH Keywords

approval votingCondorcet consistencydomination paradoxmajority judgmentmajority ruleno-show paradoxno-show syndrome

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Majority judgment vs. majority rule
• Approval voting reconsidered
• Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: a catalogue of characterizations
• Approval voting, Borda winners, and Condorcet winners: evidence from seven elections
• Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting

Cites work

• A nail-biting election
• A theory of measuring, electing, and ranking
• Analyzing a nail-biting election
• Condorcet domains, median graphs and the single-crossing property
• Expressive voting and its cost: evidence from runoffs with two or three candidates
• Handbook on approval voting
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3854738 (Why is no real title available?)
• Judge: Don't vote!
• Majority judgment vs. majority rule
• On the likelihood of single-peaked preferences
• Top monotonicity: a common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result

Cited in

(6)

• What majority decisions are possible
• Majority vote following a debate
• Majority judgment vs. majority rule
• MAJORITY-VOTE ON DIRECTED BARABÁSI–ALBERT NETWORKS
• Majority voting on orders
• Measuring consensus and voter influence in ternary preferences

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