Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on difference of votes
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 992411 (Why is no real title available?)
- Collective transitivity in majorities based on difference in support
- Condorcet's paradox
- Condorcet's paradox with three candidates
- Majority decisions based on difference of votes
- On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
- Probabilities of preferences and cycles with super majority rules
- Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis
- Robustness of positional scoring over subsets of alternatives
- Some further characterizations for the forgotten voting rules
- The forgotten decision rules: majority rules based on difference of votes
- The probability of Condorcet cycles and super majority rules
- Triple-acyclicity in majorities based on difference in support
- Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC?
Cited in
(9)- Triple-acyclicity in majorities based on difference in support
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1754618 (Why is no real title available?)
- A geometric examination of majorities based on difference in support
- Collective transitivity in majorities based on difference in support
- The forgotten decision rules: majority rules based on difference of votes
- The Effect of Closeness on the Election of a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7042404 (Why is no real title available?)
- What majority decisions are possible
- Convergence results for unanimous voting
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