Intrinsic Limitations of the Majority Rule, an Algorithmic Approach
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Publication:3682189
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Cites work
- Conditions on preferences that guarantee a simple majority winner†
- How Large are Transitive Simple Majority Domains?
- Social choice and individual values
- The extended Condorcet condition: A necessary and sufficient condition for the transitivity of majority decision
- The Simple Majority Decision Rule
- Voting Anomalies, the Number of Voters, and the Number of Alternatives
Cited in
(9)- Omnipotence in stretchable two-dimensional scaling
- Majority-consistent preference orderings
- A note on restricted majority rules: Invariance to rule selection and outcome distinctiveness
- How Large are Transitive Simple Majority Domains?
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4147800 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4043899 (Why is no real title available?)
- The capacity of majority rule
- The Weak Bruhat Order of $\text{S}_\Sigma $, Consistent Sets, and Catalan Numbers
- An extension of McGarvey's theorem from the perspective of the plurality collective choice mechanism
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