Absolute qualified majoritarianism: how does the threshold matter?

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2017.01.027MaRDI QIDQ1672882zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ali Ihsan Ozkes, M. Remzi Sanver

Publication date 11 September 2018

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01416727

zbMATH Keywords

qualified majority rulessimple majority rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences
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Cites work

• A characterization for qualified majority voting rules
• A complete characterization of majority rules
• A new characterization of the majority rule
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• Another characterization of the majority rule.
• Characterizations of majoritarianism: a unified approach
• Characterizing majority rule: from profiles to societies
• Consistency of decision processes
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3400720 (Why is no real title available?)
• Maskin monotonic aggregation rules
• More on the majority rule: profiles, societies, and responsiveness
• The forgotten decision rules: majority rules based on difference of votes
• Tournament solutions and majority voting

Cited in

(4)

• Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences
• A characterization for qualified majority voting rules
• Classification aggregation without unanimity
• An axiomatic characterization of the proportional threshold methods: a geometric approach

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