Voting procedures under uncertainty
Much of social choice theory is deterministic. Here the author considers the impact of various types of uncertainty on social choice theory, and especially voting theory. The author sets as his goal the study of `uncertainty as it pertains to electoral institutions'. In particular, he considers the effects of voter uncertainty, ignorance and incompetence on outcomes as well as procedure-dependence of results. In Chapter 1, the author briefly covers the basics of choice theory and raising the central problem of how well given procedures for making a choice meet abstract requirements for suitable decisions. This theme is expanded upon in Chapter 2, where procedure-dependence of results is described, and the author looks at the chaotic nature of various systems, especially hierarchical ones. In the third chapter, the author gives a brief summary of a large number of voting procedures depending on what he calls the `basic model', that is, where voters have complete and transitive preference relations. He shows which methods satisfy which intuitively desirable properties. In Chapter 4, the author turns to probabilistic models and constructing procedures to maximize the likelihood of a `correct' result where voter competence may vary. An example is determining optimal jury procedures. In Chapter 5, the author considers the basic distinction between binary and positional systems and considers the consequences of voter `mistakes' in the various systems. He brings out a crucial issue in analyzing the systems in that different measures of distance are appropriate for different `goal states', where what is considered desirable may differ. Next, in Chapter 6, the author studies the ways in which different procedures respond to changes in voter opinions and are liable to no-show and truncation paradoxes. Here, the focus of uncertainty is the relationship between the outcome of a vote and the preferences of the voters. In particular, in the presence of manipulability, how much can one infer of the true desires of the voters from the expressed preferences? Chapter 7 is an explanation of some of Saari's recent work on voting systems and especially the implications of manipulating the Condorcet and reversal portions of a profile that Saari has used to argue in favor of the Borda system. A final chapter concludes the arguments. The author ranges over a variety of types of uncertainty and shows the impact of the various ideas on many of the most widely-studied and widely-used procedures. The explanations are clear and accompanied by either simple theoretical examples or ones drawn from recent political experience. The book contains a wealth of information for the interested reader.
- Discrepancies in the outcomes resulting from different voting schemes
- Comparative analysis of voting procedures: A review and new problems
- Unsettling aspects of voting theory
- On the significance of the prior of a correct decision in committees
- Choice stabilities in the graph model for conflict resolution
- A theoretical examination of the ranked choice voting procedure
- The ultimate of chaos resulting from weighted voting systems
- Systematic analysis of multiple voting rules
- Finessing a point: augmenting the core
- Preference elicitation and robust winner determination for single- and multi-winner social choice
- Condorcet consistency and the strong no show paradoxes
- Incorporating collective functions to multicriteria disaggregation-aggregation approaches for small group decision making
- Citizen candidates under uncertainty
- Complexity and the geometry of voting
- A distance measure for choice functions
- Finding socially best spanning treesî
- Pareto violations of parliamentary voting systems
- Fuzzy social choice: a selective retrospect
- A dynamical model of electoral competition
- Kinetic modelling and electoral competition
- Consequences of reversing preferences
- Is majority consistency possible?
- Connecting pairwise and positional election outcomes
- Voting on Actions with Uncertain Outcomes
- A participatory budget model under uncertainty
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4045432 (Why is no real title available?)
- Are Condorcet procedures so bad according to the reinforcement axiom?
- Condorcet's principle and the strong no-show paradoxes
- Voting procedures, complexity of
- The wasted vote phenomenon with uncertain voter population
- Beyond Condorcet: optimal aggregation rules using voting records
- Another perspective on Borda's paradox
- Condorcet vs. Borda in light of a dual majoritarian approach
- The Inversion Paradox and Ranking Methods in Tournaments
- Maximizing the minimum voter satisfaction on spanning trees
- Level \(r\) consensus and stable social choice
- On the positive association of parliamentary social choice functions
- A note on maximizing the minimum voter satisfaction on spanning trees
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