Choice stabilities in the graph model for conflict resolution
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Publication:2140291
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2021.11.034zbMath1506.91045OpenAlexW3217738327MaRDI QIDQ2140291
Leandro C. Rêgo, D. Marc Kilgour
Publication date: 20 May 2022
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2021.11.034
choice functiongroup decisions and negotiationsgraph model for conflict resolutionstability definitions
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Optimism pessimism stability in the graph model for conflict resolution for multilateral conflicts ⋮ A framework to design game theory-based interventions for strategic analysis of real-world problems with stakeholders
Cites Work
- Handbook of group decision and negotiation
- The graph model for conflicts
- Upper and lower probabilistic preferences in the graph model for conflict resolution
- Mixed stabilities for analyzing opponents' heterogeneous behavior within the graph model for conflict resolution
- Choice functions and hard choices
- A distance measure for choice functions
- Maximization and the Act of Choice
- Choice Functions and Revealed Preference
- Equilibrium points in n -person games
- On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings
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