Majority selection of one alternative from a binary agenda
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Publication:531422
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.11.024zbMATH Open1210.91031OpenAlexW1967466550MaRDI QIDQ531422FDOQ531422
Authors: Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly 
Publication date: 29 April 2011
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.11.024
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Cites Work
- A simple characterization of majority rule
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Another characterization of the majority rule.
- A new characterization of the majority rule
- A complete characterization of majority rules
Cited In (11)
- Partially dominant choice
- How to Put through Your Agenda in Collective Binary Decisions
- Anonymous and neutral majority rules
- Symmetric majority rules
- Collective identity functions with status quo
- Breaking ties in collective decision-making
- Anonymity, monotonicity, and limited neutrality: selecting a single alternative from a binary agenda
- Anonymous and positively responsive aggregation rules
- The sufficient and necessary condition of the major stochastic preference rule in group decision making
- Resolute refinements of social choice correspondences
- Flexible majority rules in democracyville: a guided tour
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