Relaxing IIA and the effect on individual power

DOI10.1007/S10058-013-0140-3zbMath1293.91057OpenAlexW2046218597MaRDI QIDQ370962

Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Publication date: 20 September 2013

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-013-0140-3

zbMATH Keywords

Arrow's theoreminformation gatheringindividual powerrelevant alternatives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Welfare economics (91B15)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Nonbinary social choice for economic environments
• Information and preference aggregation
• Nonbinary Social Choice: An Impossibility Theorem
• Arrovian Social Choice Correspondences

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