Relaxing IIA and the effect on individual power

DOI10.1007/S10058-013-0140-3MaRDI QIDQ370962zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Publication date 20 September 2013

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-013-0140-3

zbMATH Keywords

Arrow's theoreminformation gatheringindividual powerrelevant alternatives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Welfare economics (91B15)

Recommendations

• Information and preference aggregation
• Independent Decisiveness and the Arrow theorem
• Social choice trade-offs for an arbitrary measure:
• Limits on power and rationality
• Preference densities and social choices

Cites work

• Arrovian Social Choice Correspondences
• Information and preference aggregation
• Nonbinary Social Choice: An Impossibility Theorem
• Nonbinary social choice for economic environments
• Pareto, anonymity or neutrality, but not IIA: countably many alternatives

Cited in

(3)

• Power of enforcement and dictatorship
• Information and preference aggregation
• Twitching weak dictators

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