Relaxing IIA and the effect on individual power

DOI10.1007/S10058-013-0140-3zbMATH Open1293.91057OpenAlexW2046218597MaRDI QIDQ370962FDOQ370962

Authors: Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly 

Publication date: 20 September 2013

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-013-0140-3

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zbMATH Keywords

Arrow's theoreminformation gatheringindividual powerrelevant alternatives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Welfare economics (91B15)

Cites Work

• Arrovian Social Choice Correspondences
• Information and preference aggregation
• Nonbinary social choice for economic environments
• Pareto, anonymity or neutrality, but not IIA: countably many alternatives
• Nonbinary Social Choice: An Impossibility Theorem

Cited In (3)

• Power of enforcement and dictatorship
• Twitching weak dictators
• Information and preference aggregation

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