Anonymous, neutral, and strategy-proof rules on the Condorcet domain

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2015.01.009MaRDI QIDQ498871zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Publication date 29 September 2015

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.01.009

zbMATH Keywords

anonymityCondorcetneutralitysocial choice rulesstrategy-proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites work

• A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule
• Parity dependence of a majority rule characterization on the Condorcet domain

Cited in

(5)

• A theoretical examination of the ranked choice voting procedure
• Condorcet's principle and the preference reversal paradox
• On coalitional stability of anonymous interim mechanisms
• Another strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule
• Condorcet consistency and pairwise justifiability under variable agendas

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