Anonymous, neutral, and strategy-proof rules on the Condorcet domain

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2015.01.009zbMATH Open1321.91034OpenAlexW2094228445MaRDI QIDQ498871FDOQ498871

Authors: Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly 

Publication date: 29 September 2015

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.01.009

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessanonymityCondorcetneutralitysocial choice rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule
• Parity dependence of a majority rule characterization on the Condorcet domain

Cited In (4)

• On coalitional stability of anonymous interim mechanisms
• Condorcet's principle and the preference reversal paradox
• A theoretical examination of the ranked choice voting procedure
• Another strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule

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