On coalitional stability of anonymous interim mechanisms

DOI10.1007/PL00004190MaRDI QIDQ5953036zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gabrielle Demange, Roger Guesnerie

Publication date 27 May 2002

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/pl00004190

zbMATH Keywords

coreincentive mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Review text

The authors investigate the stability of mechanisms with respect to coalitional deviations under the situation where agents have private information. They propose two different analysis, normative and strategic. Applications to taxation and insurance are given.

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