On coalitional stability of anonymous interim mechanisms

DOI10.1007/PL00004190zbMATH Open1004.91048OpenAlexW3023670218MaRDI QIDQ5953036FDOQ5953036

Authors: Gabrielle Demange, Roger Guesnerie 

Publication date: 27 May 2002

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/pl00004190

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zbMATH Keywords

coreincentive mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Cited In (3)

• Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The \textit{ex ante} incentive compatible core of the assignment game.

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