On coalitional stability of anonymous interim mechanisms

DOI10.1007/PL00004190MaRDI QIDQ5953036zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gabrielle Demange, Roger Guesnerie

Publication date 27 May 2002

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/pl00004190

zbMATH Keywords

coreincentive mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

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