A New Solution Concept for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments

DOI10.1007/11780496_6MaRDI QIDQ3617024zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Makoto Yokoo, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki

Publication date 26 March 2009

Published in New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/11780496_6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42) Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80)

Recommendations

• Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions
• Coalition formation processes with belief revision among bounded-rational self-interested agents
• Stable k-person coalitions in an n-person cooperative game
• Equivalence nucleolus for coalitional games with externalities
• Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
• Methods for task allocation via agent coalition formation
• The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions.
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• Theory of games and economic behavior.

Cited in

(8)

• Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core
• The Cost of Stability in Network Flow Games
• Proof systems and transformation games
• Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems
• Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value
• Algorithms – ESA 2004
• On coalitional stability of anonymous interim mechanisms
• Reasoning about coalitional games

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