Characterizing plurality rule on a fixed population

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2016.07.006zbMath1396.91148OpenAlexW2471713163MaRDI QIDQ1668501

Jerry S. Kelly, Shaofang Qi

Publication date: 29 August 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.07.006

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicityneutralityanonymitypluralitysocial choice correspondencetops-only

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (6)

Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules ⋮ A stability property in social choice theory ⋮ Uniform random dictatorship: a characterization without strategy-proofness ⋮ Opinion aggregation: Borda and Condorcet revisited ⋮ Daunou's voting rule and the lexicographic assignment of priorities ⋮ Consistency of scoring rules: a reinvestigation of composition-consistency

Cites Work

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• Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains
• Characterizations of the plurality function
• A characterization result for the plurality rule
• An efficiency characterization of plurality social choice on simple preference domains
• An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems
• A simple characterization of plurality rule
• A characterization of plurality-like rules based on non-manipulability, restricted efficiency, and anonymity
• Social Choice Scoring Functions
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision

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