Are Condorcet procedures so bad according to the reinforcement axiom?
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148878 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 44383 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1897331 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 878682 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1414348 (Why is no real title available?)
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
- Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
- Behavioral social choice. Probabilistic models, statistical inference, and applications.
- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
- Condorcet’s Paradox
- How frequently do different voting rules encounter voting paradoxes in three-candidate elections?
- Intransitive indifference with unequal indifference intervals
- On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
- Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis
- Social Choice Scoring Functions
- The reinforcement axiom under sequential positional rules
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