Are Condorcet procedures so bad according to the reinforcement axiom?
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Publication:404755
DOI10.1007/S00355-013-0758-7zbMATH Open1302.91078OpenAlexW2064171732WikidataQ114018207 ScholiaQ114018207MaRDI QIDQ404755FDOQ404755
Authors: S. Courtin, Boniface Mbih, Issofa Moyouwou
Publication date: 4 September 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0758-7
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