Voting games and acyclic collective choice rules

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(94)00770-9zbMATH Open0886.90023OpenAlexW1994373105WikidataQ56763767 ScholiaQ56763767MaRDI QIDQ1377459FDOQ1377459

Michel Truchon

Publication date: 26 January 1998

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(94)00770-9

zbMATH Keywords

acyclicityvoting gamesaggregation of preferencescollective choice rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

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• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
• On the core of voting games
• Acyclic Collective Choice Rules
• k-Monotone Social Decision Functions and the Veto
• General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
• Representations of binary decision rules by generalized decisiveness structures
• Acyclic choice and group veto
• Acyclicity and decisiveness structures
• Social Decision Functions and the Veto
• From social welfare ordering to acyclic aggregation of preferences
• Representations of simple games by social choice functions
• A Social Choice Interpretation of the Von Neumann-Morgenstern Game
• Binary games in constitutional form and collective choice

Cited In (14)

• Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: the core without majority dissatisfaction
• The theory of voting and equilibria in noncooperative games
• The power of a collectivity to act in weighted voting games with many small voters
• A new approach for identifying the Kemeny median ranking
• Voting games, indifference, and consistent sequential choice rules
• The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games
• Collectively rational voting rules for simple preferences
• A note on the core of voting games
• Gibbard-Satterthwaite games for \(k\)-approval voting rules
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core
• Stability of voting games
• A conflict analysis approach for illuminating distributional issues in sustainability policy
• Conditions on social-preference cycles

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