Voting games and acyclic collective choice rules

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(94)00770-9MaRDI QIDQ1377459zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Michel Truchon

Publication date 26 January 1998

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(94)00770-9

zbMATH Keywords

acyclicityaggregation of preferencescollective choice rulesvoting games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Acyclicity and decisiveness structures
• Acyclic social choice from finite sets
• Social choice and cooperative game theory: voting games as social aggregation functions
• Limits of acyclic voting

Cites work

• A Social Choice Interpretation of the Von Neumann-Morgenstern Game
• Acyclic choice and group veto
• Acyclic Collective Choice Rules
• Acyclicity and decisiveness structures
• Binary games in constitutional form and collective choice
• From social welfare ordering to acyclic aggregation of preferences
• General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3898540 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 44383 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3084669 (Why is no real title available?)
• k-Monotone Social Decision Functions and the Veto
• On the core of voting games
• Representations of binary decision rules by generalized decisiveness structures
• Representations of simple games by social choice functions
• Social Decision Functions and the Veto
• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences

Cited in

(15)

• The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games
• Voting games, indifference, and consistent sequential choice rules
• The theory of voting and equilibria in noncooperative games
• Stability of voting games
• A note on the core of voting games
• Acyclicity and decisiveness structures
• A new approach for identifying the Kemeny median ranking
• Gibbard-Satterthwaite games for k-approval voting rules
• Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2183045 (Why is no real title available?)
• Conditions on social-preference cycles
• Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: the core without majority dissatisfaction
• Collectively rational voting rules for simple preferences
• The power of a collectivity to act in weighted voting games with many small voters
• A conflict analysis approach for illuminating distributional issues in sustainability policy

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