Voting games and acyclic collective choice rules

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(94)00770-9zbMath0886.90023OpenAlexW1994373105WikidataQ56763767 ScholiaQ56763767MaRDI QIDQ1377459

Michel Truchon

Publication date: 26 January 1998

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(94)00770-9

zbMATH Keywords

acyclicityvoting gamesaggregation of preferencescollective choice rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (7)

Conditions on social-preference cycles ⋮ A conflict analysis approach for illuminating distributional issues in sustainability policy ⋮ Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: the core without majority dissatisfaction ⋮ Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core ⋮ A note on the core of voting games ⋮ The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games ⋮ A new approach for identifying the Kemeny median ranking

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• k-Monotone Social Decision Functions and the Veto
• Social Decision Functions and the Veto
• A Social Choice Interpretation of the Von Neumann-Morgenstern Game
• General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions

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