Acyclicity and the dispersion of the veto power

DOI10.1007/BF00182192zbMATH Open0834.90010OpenAlexW3121313565MaRDI QIDQ1804569FDOQ1804569

Michel Truchon, Michel Le Breton

Publication date: 1 April 1996

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00182192

zbMATH Keywords

acyclicityveto powerarrovian binary decision rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Cooperative games (91A12)

Cited In (6)

• Acyclicity, anonymity, and prefilters
• Limits of acyclic voting
• Limited Rights as Partial Veto and Sen’s Impossibility Theorem
• On \(\mathcal S\)-independence and Hansson's external independence
• Vetoer and tie-making group theorems for indifference-transitive aggregation rules
• Conditions on social-preference cycles

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