Acyclicity and the dispersion of the veto power

DOI10.1007/BF00182192MaRDI QIDQ1804569zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Michel Le Breton, Michel Truchon

Publication date 1 April 1996

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00182192

zbMATH Keywords

acyclicityveto powerarrovian binary decision rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Cooperative games (91A12)

Recommendations

• Acyclicity and decisiveness structures
• Acyclic choice and group veto
• Limits of acyclic voting
• Acyclic social choice from finite sets

Cited in

(8)

• On \(\mathcal S\)-independence and Hansson's external independence
• Limits of acyclic voting
• Limited Rights as Partial Veto and Sen’s Impossibility Theorem
• Acyclicity, anonymity, and prefilters
• Acyclic choice and group veto
• Vetoer and tie-making group theorems for indifference-transitive aggregation rules
• Conditions on social-preference cycles
• Neutral veto correspondences with a continuum of alternatives

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