A foundation for Pareto aggregation

DOI10.1006/JETH.1994.1068MaRDI QIDQ1339753zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Donald E. Campbell, Ryo-Ichi Nagahisa

Publication date 8 December 1994

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1068

zbMATH Keywords

social welfare functionArrow's independence axiom

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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• The aggregation of preferences: Can we ignore the past?
• Positional information and preference aggregation
• Aggregate objective functions and Pareto frontiers: required relationships and practical implications
• The tyranny of non-aggregation versus the tyranny of aggregation in social choices: a real dilemma
• Implementation of Social Welfare Functions
• Characterization of Pareto dominance
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7730629 (Why is no real title available?)
• Pareto efficiency with spatial rights
• On the difficulty of combining actual and potential criteria for an increase in social welfare
• Social choice, the strong Pareto principle, and conditional decisiveness
• A foundation for Pareto optimality
• An oligarchy theorem in fixed agenda without Pareto conditions
• A note on a group preference axiomatization with cardinal utility

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